A summary of a speech on the topic "Doha 3: The Modality of the Islamic Emirate’s Interaction with the International Community," organized by the Center for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The first meeting of special representatives from several countries for Afghanistan, chaired by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, was held in Doha in May 2023. The second one took place on February 18-19 of this year, to which the Islamic Emirate was also invited. However, participation was not possible due to the Emirate's conditions not being met.
Now, a third meeting is scheduled for June 30 and July 1. This time, not only has the Islamic Emirate been invited, but numerous Western and regional delegations have come to Kabul and are encouraging the Islamic Emirate to participate in “Doha 3.” Last month, Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; the Deputy Foreign Minister of Qatar; a delegation from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and the EU Special Representative Tomas Niklasson visited Kabul and encouraged the Foreign Minister to participate in Doha 3. This time it seems that the meeting-organizers and hosts are trying to ensure the participation of the Islamic Emirate in Doha 3 to avoid the absence of the Islamic Emirate’s delegation casting a shadow over the future meeting, as it did over the previous one.
The Islamic Emirate has held preliminary negotiations with the UN Secretary-General’s deputy and Qatari officials regarding Doha 3, and an initial agenda has also been shared. The agenda includes topics that both parties might be ready to discuss; however, Kabul is waiting for the UN’s promise to share the final details, agenda, and composition of the meeting so that a decision can be made regarding participation.
Background of the Doha Meetings
The series of Doha meetings, in fact, go back to UN Security Council resolutions. In March 2023, the UN Security Council assigned the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan through Resolution 2679. Japan and the United Arab Emirates, the penholders of the Afghanistan dossier in the Security Council, were the main presenters of this proposal.
In accordance with the Security Council's request, on April 25 of last year, the Secretary-General appointed former Turkish politician and diplomat Feridun Sinirlioğlu as the special coordinator to conduct the independent assessment. Sinirlioğlu shared the preliminary draft of his assessment with the Security Council member states on November 17. There were sufficient discussions among the Security Council member states about the assessment. Russia and China insisted that the Afghan government’s perspective should be considered regarding the assessment's recommendations. In the end, Sinirlioğlu’s independent assessment was approved by the Security Council on December 29, 2023, through Resolution 2721, with Russia and China abstaining from voting. This way, Sinirlioğlu’s independent assessment was endorsed by the UN Security Council.
Sinirlioğlu’s Assessment
Sinirlioğlu’s assessment is composed of four parts: Introduction, Major Issues and Priorities, Recommendations, and Conclusion. The key parts are the second, which identifies major issues and priorities, and the third, which contains recommendations and the support mechanisms for the process.
Regarding Afghanistan’s issues, humanitarian matters, human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, security and terrorism, narcotics, developmental, economic, and social challenges, dialogue, governance, and rule of law are mentioned as fundamental problems.
The introduction to the recommendations states that many international players support increased global engagement but in a coordinated, coherent, and systematic manner with clear outcomes for all parties. In the recommendations, the assessment outlines a roadmap in which the Islamic Emirate must take specific steps, and in the end, Afghanistan should be recognized by the international community as an official state.
The first recommendation calls on the international community to meet the urgent needs of Afghans through confidence-building measures. For instance, assistance should be more organized and stable, particularly in areas of food security, livelihoods, and health. It is also recommended that international aid, which meets the primary needs of Afghans, be expanded; economic talks and reforms should begin for economic reconstruction to remove various obstacles; barriers to regular transit, trade, and other connectivity routes between Afghanistan and the world should be removed; and steps should be taken so that Afghans can realize their political, economic, cultural, and social rights.
The second recommendation calls for cooperation in security, regional, and political areas. For example, support for bilateral and multilateral security cooperation; assistance with international efforts against narcotics; strengthening international borders, including effective control of boundaries; expanding international cooperation and aid supporting regional and global priorities; reviewing and updating the 1988 UN sanctions list; and gradually resuming diplomatic engagement within Afghanistan.
The third part of the recommendations presents a roadmap for the reintegration of Afghanistan's government into the international order, which is the most important part. In this roadmap, the duties of Afghanistan’s government are identified, for example, Afghanistan is asked to accept the UN Charter and all conventions it previously endorsed, and to create conditions for an inclusive government through intra-Afghan talks. The recommendation also calls on the international community to normalize relations with the Islamic Emirate.
Support Mechanisms for Engagement
In the fourth section of the recommendations, Mr. Sinirlioğlu proposes three mechanisms to support engagement:
A. A high-level format led by the UN, which includes special representatives from various countries for Afghanistan. The Doha meetings are based on this recommendation, with the third one scheduled for June 30. The Emirate does not oppose the format of the Doha meetings, but it is crucial to know what is being discussed, who the participants are, and how the Islamic Emirate's participation is considered. Due to disagreements on these points, the Islamic Emirate declined to participate in Doha 2.
B. The International Contact Group, which will be smaller compared to the major Doha meeting. This smaller group will coordinate actions and policies among international partners, ensure continuous and in-depth engagement, and maintain interaction with the Afghan government.
Due to new waves of geopolitical competition and the widening gaps, distrust, and disagreements between regional and Western countries, the UN has not been able to establish the International Contact Group. After increasing disagreements between the US, Russia, and China, member countries have been unable to hold the Troika Plus meetings for Afghanistan since 2022. Considering these gaps and distrust, it seems unlikely that the UN will succeed in creating the International Contact Group.
C. A special representative of the United Nations to facilitate engagement between international and Afghan parties. The special representative’s mission will involve diplomacy between Afghanistan and the international community, as well as intra-Afghan talks.
The Islamic Emirate considers the appointment of a special representative unnecessary. Some other regional countries also question the need for appointing another special representative given the presence of UNAMA. First, the Afghan government is practically in contact with many countries through bilateral mechanisms, so it can discuss all issues and find solutions to challenges with Western countries through bilateral mechanisms as well. Second, the intra-Afghan talks issue was relevant before August 15, 2021, because at that time the power transition in Afghanistan was a necessity, which has already occurred. Before August 2021, there were talks between the Islamic Emirate and the Kabul regime. Now that the power transfer has taken place, the Kabul regime no longer exists, and the Islamic Emirate effectively governs the entire country; so, who will the intra-Afghan talks be between, as one of the parties that previously held political power no longer exists? Third, the appointment of another special representative is unnecessary given the presence of UNAMA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the IEA has a regular working relationship with UNAMA, so what additional tasks will another special representative perform?
Conclusion
So far, there is an initial agreement on the agenda of the Doha 3 meeting to discuss financial and banking issues, the fight against narcotics, alternative livelihoods, and possibly climate change-related issues.
From the preliminary agenda, it appears that controversial issues will not be discussed in Doha 3. Who will attend the meeting is not yet clear. However, considering the outcomes of Doha 2 and current preliminary discussions, it seems that the meeting organizers and hosts are trying to ensure that the composition is not controversial. One reason for the Islamic Emirate’s non-participation in the previous meeting was the unacceptable composition of the meeting.
Alongside all these, it is likely that the Islamic Emirate will decide on participation in Doha 3 when the final details of the meeting are shared by the UN with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Comment this post